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As a surgeon in a private practice surgical group,
you have just been informed that an emergencymeeting
has been called this evening for your group to discuss a
crisis with a major private insurance payor. Several
members of the group, including a vascular surgeon, a
general surgeon, and an orthopedist, have been ex-
cluded from future reimbursements because they were
not credentialed as higher-quality specialists. The higher-
quality specialists were designated as such because of
their lower admission rates, lower readmission rates,
shorter lengths of hospital stay, and fewer complica-
tions according to the insurance company’s practice
screens. Those surgeons not included will, by not being
on the preferred list, become known to the other insur-
ers. This particular insurer accounts for a double-digit
share of the group’s income and your income. Other-
wise, this payor has paid well, and transactions have
been relatively hassle free. What should the group’s
response to this latest intrusion be?
A. Use the Musketeer strategy and refuse to do business
unless the excluded partners are reinstated.
B. Try to get the patients of your excluded partners to opt
for other insurance coverage.
C. Sue the insurer for defamation.
D. Let the partners who could not make the grade go.
E. Examine the data and, if fair, insist that the partners not
included improve their outcomes.
Physician compensation has taken many turns and
twists over the past three decades, and the economic land-
scape of private health care insurance is shifting once again.
At the onset of managed care, private and governmental
insurers had considerable economic data to suspect that
physicians, as a profession, were oversupplying health care.1
Payors sought to control the physician side of the equation;
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of success in controlling physician behavior, less in control-
ling costs, and it has produced a backlash of patients,
physicians, and health care institutions responsible for an
industry-wide rethinking of strategic focus, product design,
and pricing policies.2 There remains much interest on every
side in improving the quality of care, although definitions
may vary considerably between physicians and patients on
one side and hospital administrators and payors on the
other.
Quality is a human product or service’s standard of
acceptability; it is a descriptor of how well something was
done. The determination of quality requires comparisons
of similar endeavors after deciding on what constitutes a
desirable outcome. The confusion seems to result from the
notion that value is interchangeable with quality. Value is
the cost of quality.
Historically, quality was exclusively the concern of the
physicians, and finance was left to the hospital administration.
This long-standing tradition faded when cost-plus reimburse-
ment systems were replaced by diagnosis-related groups and
other tactics designed to reduce hospital reimbursements.3
Quality of care, once measured only by clinical outcome,
became surrogate financial variables, such as average hospital
or intensive care unit days, operating room cost, total cost of
hospitalization by diagnosis, or even the time it takes a partic-
ular surgeon to do a procedure. With the rapid expansion
during the 1990s of the managed care paradigm, payors
began to use the quality word as a standard of excellence of
both cost and good clinical outcome, but mainly cost. They
abdicated specifically pinning down clinical outcomes as prac-
tical standards because physicians remained the experts in
defining clinical quality, and clinical outcomes should, after
all, parallel cost. Patients were the last to be concerned about
quality until their rock-solid trustwas somewhat erodedby the
landmark 1999 report on medical errors by the Institute of
Medicine, changes endorsed by the Leapfrog Group, and
generally the attached publicity.4 Patients were significantly
more concerned about the quality of their medical care than
physicians.5
It also seems that what is meant by higher quality is not
raising the apogee of the normalized curve but reducing the
rightward tail where the worst outcomes often reside. The
cost-savings from reducing the worst outcomes would
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vices to bare-bones care for the sole purpose of decreasing
costs by providing only essentials is less ethical (particularly
when the insured does not know they have a coach policy).
There is little mystery about what “quality” of medical
care means; it means adherence to standards of medical
care based on the best available evidence. This should not
be caricatured, as it often is, by the counterclaim that there
aren’t many randomized, controlled clinical trials for every-
thing that physicians do. This may be true, but it is an
irrelevant retort, because quality concepts are applied only
to therapies common enough to have sufficient data to
analyze. Moreover, randomized trials are but one, not the
sole, level of evidence.
Evidence-based medicine involves mastery of the disci-
pline of applying the best available evidence to reduce
uncontrolled and therefore unjustified variation in the pro-
cesses and outcomes of medical care. Not only has uncon-
trolled negative variation in the processes of medical care
and therefore in their outcomes caused preventable mortal-
ity and morbidity, but it has also resulted in preventable,
high rates of cost increases. Physicians are obligated, there-
fore, to conform clinical judgment and decision making to
the best available professional standards, because this is the
only basis for becoming and remaining scientifically and
clinically competent. Becoming and remaining scientifically
and clinically competent is the bedrock component of
fiduciary responsibility or medical professionalism, con-
cepts introduced into the history of medical ethics in the
18th century by John Gregory (1724-1773) and Thomas
Percival (1740-1804).6,7
As noted in our study case, private medical insurance is
being modified. Government payers and private health care
insurers are busy developing new products that transition
from a managed care focus on controlling the cost of
physician behaviors to altering the patient side of the equa-
tion with “customer-driven” health care systems. The
products thus far consist of health savings accounts, high-
deductible preferred provider policies, and policies limited
to “high-quality providers.”8,9
The latter is a targeted attempt to switch compensation
to physicians providing higher-quality care or more specif-
ically away from bottom-dwellers. The result should be to
align the financial self-interests of insurance payors with
fiduciary responsibility to patient care. Not only can there
be no persuasive ethical objection to such a change, but it
should be actively embraced by physicians as a means to
strengthen their commitment to fiduciary responsibility.
Medical institutions, for various reasons including lack of
authority, legal liability, and guild restraints, do little to
control the worst doctors.10 The basic stated purpose is to
make patients more knowledgeable and therefore moti-
vated and effective consumers of quality medical care,
rather than having medical care directed by cost consider-
ations disconnected from fiduciary responsibility. Not ev-
eryone considers consumer-driven health care to be a good
thing. Burda11 fumes,One of the greatest public-relations coups in the history
of the healthcare industry is the creation of the term
“consumer-driven healthcare.” Anyone who follows
healthcare knows that consumers had nothing to do with
this latest cost-saving invention from the minds of em-
ployers and health insurers. And the only “movement”
attached to the term is the transfer of money from the
pockets of patients into those of employers and insurers
and, potentially, healthcare providers.
Nevertheless, the rate of increase of health care costs slowed
in 2005 to 9.2%, which is the lowest rise since 1999 but still
exceeds the rise in wages by threefold. Either the employee
or the employer of those with private insurance has to make
up the difference, and without some economic solution,
physicians will price themselves out of reach or the “big
brother” regulatory arm of the government will become
the undesired but unavoidable solution.
We are concerned in this article with one of leading
edges of the new movement toward pay for performance
joined to educated patients, exemplified by the Aexcel pro-
gram of the Aetna insurance company. The above higher-
quality specialist designation is probably no surprise to
surgeons in the Jacksonville, Dallas, and Seattle areas;
Aetna has instituted its Aexcel program denying participa-
tion to the lesser-quality specialists there, according to
Dr. John Rowe, the physician CEO of Aetna insurance.8
Twenty additional urban markets are primed to follow by
the time this issue of the Journal appears in your mailbox.
The concept is appealing from a marketing perspective. As
explained above, it is to be applauded from an ethical
perspective, provided that the selection process is truly
resulting in better clinical outcomes. Higher-quality spe-
cialists are selected who will provide better clinical quality
care that will cost less because they are more skilled, and
their patients will, as a rule, therefore have better outcomes.
All surgeons are equal only under the law, a chafing aware-
ness. And those most incompetent sometimes slip through
the system’s cracks.10 Having oneself or a close family
member faced with need for a serious operation, it would
be a rare surgeon indeed whowas nonselective in the choice
of an attending surgeon. Why should not the same selec-
tivity be available to all patients? Aetna claims to offer aid
for patients to do just that, thus saving patients from
choosing lower- or poor-quality surgeons by a policy per-
mitting them to have operations done only by “high-
quality” surgeons.
Answer A is an unthinking, petulant response to the
threat. It is also self-defeating, because recent experience
with managed care should have convinced everyone that
the power of big money trumps individual physicians.
Moreover, it indicates that the first loyalty is to members of
your group, a “guild mentality” that both Gregory and
Percival attacked as antithetical to professional integrity.
Gregory’s language is harsh when he describes the guild
mentality as “a narrow, selfish, corporation-spirit.”12 p. 237Your unwavering loyalty to associates should follow your
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tive professional perspective.
B is a worse choice still. Asking patients to alter their
insurance at perhaps greater expense for your group’s con-
tinued care involves the raw assertion of individual and
guild self-interest and is therefore wrong on its face. Using
your professional influence for such base purposes is de-
structive of professional integrity.
Expecting the courts, geared for administration of justice,
to give one mercy when one really wants mercy can be an
expensive, masochistic learning experience. In this case, your
associateswould be climbing into a ringwith themetaphorical
800-pound gorilla and a horde of his primate lawyer friends.
Answer C should await your associates’ showing that their
results are within acceptable standards, that they actually
have been defamed by being excluded from the higher-
quality group, and that financial losses were incurred. In
other words, the issue of the quality of care provided by
colleagues must be addressed, as a matter of strict, shared
fiduciary responsibility to the group’s patients.
Discharging your partners out of hand because they
cannot meet the criteria of a single payor without data to
show they are below the standards of the group practice
would be impulsive, unwarranted, and unfair. There should
be a well-defined understanding as to what constitutes a
serious enough violation in a group practice to constitute a
partner’s leaving. Also, this behavior does not consider that
group practices differ considerably in financial structuring.
Option D is thus ruled out.
In the case of the Aetna program to panel higher-
quality specialists, the ethics depend on the selection crite-
ria primarily being markers of clinical excellence with cost
savings an epiphenomenon. The Aexcel program uses three
types of criteria for identifying high-quality surgeons: (1)
criteria from the Ambulatory Care Quality Alliance (the
American College of Surgeons and Society of Vascular
Surgery are members); (2) general inpatient criteria such as
bleeding and infection rates; and (3) criteria from societies
of each specialty. Dr. Rowe was contacted and agreed to
supply the specific criteria for vascular surgeons but at this
writing has not done so. Few could argue that, provided
that data as described are accurately collected and objec-tively applied, the worse and better surgeons could be
identified. This leaves option E as the preferred method of
dealing with this challenge. Industry-originated quality-
improvement methods have long been established to work
in medical care as well as manufacturing products. Objec-
tive scrutiny that fairly compares surgeons is a gut wrench-
ing, but ethically essential, part of practice. It is not foreign
to surgeons who are held responsible in morbidity and
mortality reviews from the moment they enter residency
training. Option E also insulates the quality surgeons in the
group from risk of injury to their professional integrity, risk
that will occur if they put the group’s economic self-interest
ahead of shared fiduciary responsibility for patients. Rising
financial water can be a useful stimulus for seeking higher
professional ground.
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